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I. Introduction 
In the June issue 2015 of the International Sports Law Journal, I discussed the 
taxation of sports image rights in the UK, including the recent update of the Inland 
Revenue (HRMC) to their capital gains tax manual on the taxation of image rights.2 
The debate over more effective tax regulation for top-earning athletes has recently 
intensified, following media reports about tax evasion in the football industry and the 
potential abuse of image rights arrangements to reduce tax liabilities.3 According to 
the 2016/2017 report by the UK Public Accounts Committee, 43 players, including 
Manchester United’s Wayne Rooney, 12 clubs and eight agents are currently the 
subject of open tax inquiries related to image rights agreements.4 In separate 
investigations, Cristiano Ronaldo and Jose Mourinho, have been targeted by Spanish 
and British tax authorities for allegedly moving more than £100 million in a tax 
avoidance scheme on the British Islands.5 This article provides an update on the 
status of recent efforts to reform the taxation of foreign domiciled persons and 
offshore trusts as at January 2017. The new rules may have implications on tax and 
image right structures commonly used by foreign wealthy footballers in or moving to 
the UK. While the proposals are a step in the right direction, it is recommended that 
existing and forthcoming tax rules must be enforced more effectively to reduce tax 
evasion in the sports and entertainment industry to a bearable minimum.  
1. Background  
The economic value of image rights of sport stars has increased tremendously over 
the last decades. License fees and royalties are a valuable source of income for 
many sports personalities and clubs in Europe.6 With USD$32 million from 
endorsements alone, Cristiano Ronaldo topped the list of the Forbes’ 2016 ranking 
of the athletes earning the most from endorsements. Ronaldo holds multiple 
endorsement deals, including a number of world famous companies, Nike,  Coca-
Cola and Emirates.7 
Given the immense value of image rights, footballers and clubs often use complex 
image rights agreements to limit their overall tax liability. They can benefit from the 
current tax rules in the UK that allow image rights income to be treated as a separate 
revenue stream from the income earned from the players professional activities.8 It 
means that footballers are liable to pay UK tax on their income resulting from their 
player’s contracts. At the same time they could set up a company to receive 
payments for their valuable image rights in an offshore tax haven, for example in 
Jersey or Guernsey in the English Channel, where tax could be paid at a much lower 
corporate rate.9   
While these schemes are, generally, legal, other activities may be less legitimate and 
in some cases illegal. For example, in cases where the image of a footballer has no 
considerable commercial value, the club may still pay large sums to the image rights 
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company. Rather than paying for the commercial use of the image of the footballer, 
the club would effectively make disguised salary payments to the company to benefit 
from the lower corporate tax rate.10   
In Sports Club, Evelyn and Jocelyn plc v Inspector of Taxes 200011, Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs (HRMC) had challenged such image rights arrangements 
entered into by the premiership football club Arsenal and two of its players, Dennis 
Bergkamp and David Platt. Bergkamp had his own image rights company 
incorporated in the Dutch Antilles in 1991 and had assigned his image rights to the 
company. Platt also had an offshore image right company which contracted with 
another company. Both players signed employment contracts with Arsenal Football 
Club in 1995. Arsenal signed separate agreements with their image rights 
companies which provided Arsenal with the right to exploit the player’s image rights 
in return for an agreed fee. This fee was seen by HMRC as earnings arising from the 
player’s employment and therefore taxable. HMRC viewed the image rights 
arrangements as a “smokescreen” which had been created in an attempt to disguise 
salary payments as image rights payments. Bergkamp, Platt and Arsenal appealed 
against this ruling to the Special Commissioners claiming that the image rights 
agreements were separate genuine commercial agreements that could be enforced. 
The Special Commissioners rejected the view of HRMC and held that the 
arrangements were not a “smokescreen”. Payments made by Sports Club under the 
promotional agreement and the consultancy agreement were genuine commercial 
agreements which had independent and separate value over the employment 
contracts.12 Since the decision in Sports Club, HMRC has often sought to scrutinise 
the offshore image rights agreements reached between players and clubs, insisting 
that these were simply “disguised remuneration”.13 In 2009 HMRC informed many 
Premier League Clubs that it was examining image rights payments to players from 
2005 to 2008. In 2012 HMRC reached settlements with 15 Premier League clubs in 
relation to image rights payments. In the same year Chelsea Football Club revealed 
a payment of £6.4million “in relation to an industry-wide investigation into the 
taxation of payments under image rights” in their public accounts.14 It has been 
reported that HMRC has since agreed with football clubs that image rights can only 
make up 20% at most of a player's total earnings.15 
In summary, while HMRC has taken action to prevent the abuse of sports image 
rights arrangements, the recent report by the UK Public Accounts Committee 
suggests that not all football clubs are complying with their obligations to disclose 
their earnings under the settlement agreements.16 HRMC itself has come under fire 
for allegedly providing special customer relationship managers to wealthy sport stars 
while the amount of tax paid by this very wealthy group of individuals has actually 
fallen by £1 billion since the unit was set up in 2009.17 The report urges HRMC to be 
more transparent about its work and to deliver on its plans to counter aggressive tax 
avoidance schemes.18  
 
2. How the UK might be affected by the UK’s changes to non-dom tax rules 
Offshore image rights agreements are often used by non-UK domiciled footballers.19 
The UK's draft Finance Bill 201720 published in December 2016 brought some 
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changes to the tax rules of individuals not domiciled in the UK (non-doms). Eligibility 
for non-dom status essentially relies on showing that either the non-dom, their father 
or grandfather was born outside the UK.21 The proposed changes will come into 
effect from 6 April 2017 and will be legislated as part of the 2017 Finance Act. 
Under current UK tax law, foreign domiciled athletes can be divided into athletes who 
are resident in the UK (resident non-doms) and those that are just visiting 
temporarily to compete (visiting non-doms). Resident non-doms are resident in the 
UK for lengthy periods (for example, foreign players, who play for a Premier League 
football club, like Arsenal’s Mesut Özil or Manchester’s Zlatan Ibrahimović) while 
visiting non-doms will only visit the UK to participate in certain events, for example 
the Olympics, the Wimbledon Tennis Championships, or various athletics meetings 
throughout the year.22 The new rules will effectively only affect the first group of 
athletes, UK resident non-doms. 
a) Current tax incentives for resident non-doms 
Most foreign players in the Premier League will typically be resident non-doms for 
UK tax purposes. They can currently legitimately avoid paying UK taxes by electing 
to be taxed on the “remittance basis”.23 Under these rules, the player would be liable 
to pay tax in full on any income or capital gains earned in the UK; however any non-
UK income or gains would not be taxable under UK law unless it was brought 
(“remitted”) back in the UK. The player can choose whether or not to be taxed on the 
remittance basis for every new tax year depending on his financial circumstances for 
that year.24 He can enjoy the advantage of the remittance basis of taxation free of 
charge for the first six years of residency. After this time, there will be an annual 
remittance basis charge of £30,000 (rising to £60,000 if he has been resident for 12 
out of the last 14 years and finally £90,000 if he has been resident for 17 out of the 
last 20 years).25 In summary, the current non-dom rules are an attractive option for 
wealthy sport stars moving to the UK. For example, if Arsenal midfielder Mezut Özil, 
who will most likely be considered as resident non-dom for tax purposes, elects to 
pay an annual remittance charge after six years of residency, he can avoid paying 
tax on his global income and gains including any profits from endorsement deals 
outside the UK. 
b) What is changing? 
With effect from April 2017 the permanent non-dom status will end. Non-doms will be 
“deemed domiciled” once they have been resident in the UK for 15 of the past 20 
years (the 15/20 rule). The objective is to create a fairer and competitive tax 
regime.26 Once deemed UK domiciled, a foreign player will no longer be able to 
claim the remittance basis of tax, but will be required to pay UK tax on his personal 
foreign income and gains in the same way as UK-domiciled tax payers. The player 
can, however, preserve the attractive status as a non-dom for an extended period, if 
he leaves the UK for 6 or more consecutive tax years. In that event, the time-limit 
would begin afresh and the player could reclaim non-dom status for a further 15 
years. The rules reflect the fact that some non-doms are internationally mobile and 
that they should be treated differently from those who are firmly based in the UK.27 
Given this tax incentive, it can be expected that many sport stars will seriously 
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consider the timing of their return to the UK as an important factor in their future tax 
planning. 
In summary, under the new rules, foreign sport stars, like Özil, will still be able to 
avoid paying tax on their global income deriving from image rights deals outside the 
UK by electing to pay on the remittance basis as above. These particular changes 
will only affect Özil if he becomes deemed domiciled in the UK once he has been 
resident in the UK for more than 15 tax years.  
3. Changes to anti-avoidance rues and offshore trusts 
Further reforms to the taxation of non-doms concern the application of existing anti- 
avoidance rules that seek to prevent UK residents from moving income and capital 
into offshore structures. Over recent years, the government has taken several steps 
designed to counter the use of offshore structures for the purpose of tax avoidance. 
In 2014, the government introduced the system of accelerated payment notices, 
allowing HMRC to collect tax from participants in schemes disclosed under the Tax 
Disclosure rules with no right to appeal against such a notice.28 In the same year the 
Promoters of Tax Avoidance Schemes (POTAS) regime was introduced to change 
the behaviour of promoters who engage in the promotion of aggressive tax 
avoidance schemes.29 Essentially, promoters of failed tax avoidance schemes may 
be required to notify their customers that they are covered by the POTAS rules and 
they may be named publicly by HMRC. Additional anti-avoidance legislation, the 
Transfer of Assets Abroad (TAA) was included in Chapter 2, Part 13, Income Tax Act 
2007 (ITA) to prevent UK resident taxpayers using foreign transfers to avoid their UK 
tax liabilities. Section 13 of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 (TCGA) 
specifically sets out how gains realised in offshore companies can be attributed to 
the individual who set up the structure.  
The government has announced that these anti-avoidance rules will to a large extent 
not apply to gains and foreign income arising within a trust structure set up by a non-
UK domiciled settlor before they were deemed UK. This exception will, however, 
apply only where no benefits are received by the individual or members of his family, 
and where no property has been added to the trust after he or she becomes deemed 
domiciled under these new rule changes.30  
The government has also announced the introduction of a package of arrangements 
to help non-doms adjust to the new regime in relation to the rebasing of foreign 
assets, cleansing of mixed funds and provisions for offshore trusts.31 It can therefore 
be expected that many sport stars who are due to lose their permanent non-dom 
status because they have lived in the UK for at least 15 years will set up new 
offshore trusts before the rules come into effect in April. These will remain outside 
the UK tax net so long as no money is paid in or out. Others may be extracting funds 
from their trust, restructuring their property holdings or considering whether to leave 
the UK. Therefore, if structured correctly, any income or gains arising on such assets 
can still be generated tax free.  
 
II. Conclusion 
Tax avoidance has consistently been on the top of the political agenda in the UK. In 
April thousands of wealthy foreign sport stars and individuals in the entertainment 
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industry are due to lose their permanent non-dom status and some tax advantages 
because they have lived in the UK for at least 15 years. The new proposed rules aim 
to strike a balance between the creation of a fairer tax system and the preservation 
and encouragement of economic activity in the UK. As a result, wealthy sport stars, 
who are considered to be major contributors to the UK economy, remain largely 
entitled to attractive, albeit time-limited, tax incentives. This raises the questions of 
whether tax incentives for non-doms bring actual net benefit to the UK at all. It is 
recommended that this should be assessed in a regular cost-benefit analysis and 
results should be publicised to allow people to see the effectiveness (or non-
effectiveness) of tax incentives for non-doms in general.  
In summary, the recent proposals passed by the UK government to make the rich 
pay their fair share of tax – although well-intentioned – are no more than a drop in 
the ocean. Firstly, the new rules provide for a generous transition period. 
Intermediaries, such as consultants, lawyers, financial and investment advisers will 
therefore have plenty of time to adjust their tax-planning, exploit new loopholes or 
shift profits of their clients to substantially reduce their tax liability. Secondly, the tax 
laws of a nation are only effective if they are properly enforced and interpreted. Many 
sport stars, however, might not feel affected by the type of trivial penalties and 
deterrents designed to make them comply with tax rules. According to the recent 
report by the UK Public Accounts Committee of the 850 penalties issued to the very 
wealthy since 2012, the average charge was only £10,500. Moreover, in the five 
years to 31 March 2016, only one case out of 72 fraud investigations resulted in a 
successful criminal prosecution.32 Indeed the figures suggest that the financial and 
reputational risks associated with tax avoidance, are outweighed by the financial 
rewards to them.33 Thirdly, HRMC should be above suspicion of conflict of interest or 
the perception of bias at any stage of the tax proceedings process. The mere 
suggestion by the report that wealthy footballers are getting a special deal from 
HRMC may otherwise strongly undermine the taxpayer’s confidence in a fair and 
functioning tax system.  
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